






























Basic Research in Computer Science
Non-Committing Encryption is Too Easy in
the Random Oracle Model
Jesper Buus Nielsen
BRICS Report Series RS-01-47
ISSN 0909-0878 December 2001
Copyright c© 2001, Jesper Buus Nielsen.
BRICS, Department of Computer Science
University of Aarhus. All rights reserved.
Reproduction of all or part of this work
is permitted for educational or research use
on condition that this copyright notice is
included in any copy.
See back inner page for a list of recent BRICS Report Series publications.
Copies may be obtained by contacting:
BRICS
Department of Computer Science
University of Aarhus
Ny Munkegade, building 540
DK–8000 Aarhus C
Denmark
Telephone: +45 8942 3360
Telefax: +45 8942 3255
Internet: BRICS@brics.dk
BRICS publications are in general accessible through the World Wide
Web and anonymous FTP through these URLs:
http://www.brics.dk
ftp://ftp.brics.dk
This document in subdirectory RS/01/47/
Non-Committing Encryption is Too Easy in




The non-committing encryption problem arises in the setting
of adaptively secure cryptographic protocols, as the task of im-
plementing secure channels. We prove that in the random oracle
model, where the parties have oracle access to a uniformly ran-
dom function, non-committing encryption can be implemented
efficiently using any trapdoor permutation.
We also prove that no matter how the oracle is instantiated in
practice the resulting scheme will never be non-committing, and




One way of constructing a secure protocol for the cryptographic model is
to take a protocol which is secure in the information theoretical model,
where secure channels are assumed, and then compile this protocol for
the cryptographic model by adding encryption to the channels.
The motivation for such an approach has been, that only statically
secure general multiparty computation protocols have been constructed
for the cryptographic model directly, whereas adaptively secure protocols
for the information theoretical model were published already in [BGW88,
CCD88].
The goal is therefore to replace the secure channels of the informa-
tion theoretical model by open channels, by using an adaptively secure
protocol for encrypting all communication on the open channels.
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It is obviously not enough to encrypt the messages using standard
public key encryption. The reason is that this allows an adversary to
observe a ciphertext from P1 to P2, say, and later send it as a ciphertext
from some corrupt party Pi to P2, thereby making Pi send the same
message as P2, which would be impossible for Pi if the communication
had been over secure channels. If, however we use a chosen ciphertext
attack (CCA) secure encryption scheme and include in the messages the
identity of the sender to protect against copying, then we will have a
statically secure implementation[Can01].
However, no CCA secure encryption scheme is known for which this
protocol is adaptively secure in the non-erasure model, where the parties
are not trusted to be able to erase parts of their state reliably. The
problem is that after sending an encryption E(m, r) of a message m the
sending party is generally committed to m.
Assume that the protocol, where P2 sends a uniformly random public
key to P1 and P1 returns c = Epk(i‖m), were adaptively secure in the mul-
tiparty computation model of e.g. [Can01]. Consider the adversary that
corrupts no party and the environment, which activates the sender with
an arbitrary message m and waits for the protocol to generate output.
We let the adversary output the observed public key pk and encryption
c. Then the environment corrupts the sender and the adversary gives to
the environment the observed random bits r such that c = Epk(m, r).
Now, by the definition of security there should exist a simulator such
that the simulator executed in the ideal process with the same environ-
ment produces an output indistinguishable from that of the adversary.
But in the ideal process for secure communication the parties basically
share a secure channel, and thus the simulator does not see anything
during the execution, and it must generate pk and c independently of
m. Then on the corruption of the sender, the simulator sees m and com-
putes rm to give to the environment. Since the environment cannot tell
the difference from the real execution it follows that pk is computationally
indistinguishable from a real public key, that rm is computationally indis-
tinguishable from a uniformly random string, and that c = Epk(m, rm).
This means that the encryption scheme has the property that one can
generate a ’fake’ public key pk and a ’fake’ encryption c such that c can
later be claimed to contain any message m.
The problem with the above protocol is that the rm, which the envi-
ronment should be shown as the internal state of the sender, cannot be
computed for typical encryption schemes. If however, we considered the
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cryptographic model with erasure, we could specify as part of the pro-
tocol that r should be erased. Then the adversary and environment will
not see r in the protocol execution and therefore the simulator should not
compute rm in the simulation either. This removes the problem and, as
already observed, we can obtain an efficient adaptive security preserving
reduction to the information theoretical model. This was first shown by
Beaver and Haber in [BH92]. There, a semantically secure encryption
scheme is used and all keys, random bits, and other values are deleted
after the message is send.
However, in many settings trusting the parties to be able to erase
parts of their state might be unrealistic, due to e.g. physical limita-
tions on erasure and weak operating systems. The first adaptive security
preserving reduction to the information theoretical model without using
erasure is by Canetti et al.[CFGN96]. They define a non-committing
encryption scheme to be a protocol which securely implements the en-
cryption functionality in the cryptographic model in the presence of ad-
versaries that might corrupt the sender and the receive adaptively. They
construct a solution based on what they call common domain trapdoor
systems and show how to build non-committing encryption based on the
RSA and the DH assumption. Their scheme has expansion factor Ω(k2),
i.e. the communication complexity of their scheme is Ω(k2) bits per
plaintext bit to be communicated.
The protocols based on the RSA and DH assumptions are the most
efficient in terms of rounds. They are both two-round protocols, which
is optimal when no secret information is shared in advance. In the first
round the receiver send a public key and in the second round the sender
sends an encryption of the message under the public key.
The protocol based on general common-domain trapdoor systems uses
an interactive protocol to set up the public keys and uses three more
rounds.
Later Beaver[Bea91] proposed a simpler and more efficient scheme
based on the DDH assumption. His scheme has expansion factor Θ(k)
and is a three-round protocol. In [DN00] Damg̊ard and Nielsen gener-
alized the ideas of Beaver to construct non-committing encryption with
a similar complexity based on the RSA assumption and showed how
to construct non-committing encryption from any collection of trapdoor
permutations (with the technical condition, that the domain of the per-
mutation can be sampled in an invertible manner).
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1.1.1 Our Result
In this paper we show that in the random oracle model non-committing
encryption can be implemented using any collection of trapdoor permu-
tations. The protocol is non-interactive (one-round) and has a constant
expansion factor. Our protocol is reminiscent of a construction of chosen
ciphertext secure encryption in [BR93], only we extend the basic seman-
tically secure system in a different manner. A message will be transmit-
ted as (mid, f(x), H(mid‖i‖j‖x‖m)), where f is trapdoor permutation
(where f−1 is only known by the receiver), H is a pseudo-random func-
tion, mid is a message id, i and j are the unique identities of the sender
respectively the receiver, and x is a uniformly random element in the
domain of f . If the function H is modeled as random oracle, i.e. a uni-
formly random function to which the parties and the adversary only have
oracle access, then this scheme can be shown to be a non-committing en-
cryption scheme. This scheme is as efficient as the protocol in [BH92] for
the erasure model. This proves that in the random oracle model, secure
channels can be implemented as efficiently as in the erasure model.
1.2 The Random Oracle Model
The idea behind the random oracle model is that by modeling primitives
as DES, MD5 or SHA using the strong assumption that they (properly
used/modified) behave like random oracles to model the properties that
these primitives actually seems to have in practice, one can build efficient
and secure protocols based on these primitives. The model has been
used to argue the security of a number of constructions. Examples are
the OAEP encryption mode for RSA[BR95], the Fiat-Shamir heuristic
for zero-knowledge proofs[FS86], and the efficient Byzantine agreement
protocol of Cachin, Kursawe, and Shoup[CKS00].
In [BR93] it is said about the methodology of proving schemes secure
in the random oracle model and then instantiating the oracle with a
carefully chosen function in practice that ‘It is our thesis that this method,
when carried out, leads to secure and efficient protocols. Indeed, protocols
constructed under this paradigm have so far proven “secure” in practice.
But we stress that all claims of provable security are claims made within
the random oracle model, and instantiating the oracle with h is only a
heuristic whose success we trust from experience.’
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1.2.1 Our Result
The second result of our paper is a negative one. We show that no matter
how the random oracle is instantiated in the standard model, our encryp-
tion protocol will not be non-committing. This shows that security in
the random oracle model does not always allow a secure implementation
in the standard model.
This is to some extend anticipated in [BR93], where it is said, that
’We stress that the protocol problem Π and protocol P must be “indepen-
dent” of the hash function we are to use. It is easy to construct unnatural
problems or protocols whose description and goals depend explicitely on
h so that the protocol is secure in the random oracle model but fails when
the random oracle is instantiated with the hash function. The notion of
“independence” will not be formalized in this paper.’
Our result is however of a different nature than this. First of all
we do not find adaptively secure encryption in the non-erasure model,
or our suggested protocol, unnatural, and second, the problem does not
depend on H at all. Indeed we prove that any function will fail to be an
“independent” function, no matter the definition of “independence”.
Other examples of constructions which are secure in the random ora-
cle model, and not in the standard model, were known prior to our work.
We will compare our result to these, and will give a short discussion of
the random oracle model based on this comparison.
1.3 Organization
In Section 2 we define collections of trapdoor permutations and state
a lemma which will come in handy later. In Section 3 we give a short
sketch of the multiparty computation model that we use and cast the
problem of non-committing encryption in this framework. In Section 4
we describe our non-committing encryption protocol and prove it secure
in the random oracle model. In Section 5 we prove that our protocol will
never be non-committing in the standard model. Finally in Section 6 we




Definition 1 (Collection of trapdoor permutations) We call a tu-
ple (K, F,G,X ) a collection of trapdoor permutations with security param-
eter k, if K is an infinite index set, F = {fpk : Dpk → Dpk}pk∈K is a set
of permutations, the key/trapdoor-generator G and the domain-generator
X are PPT algorithms, and the following hold:
Easy to generate and compute G generates pairs of keys and trap-
doors, (pk, sk) ← G(k), where pk ∈ K ∩ {0, 1}p(k) for some fixed
polynomial p(k). Furthermore, there is a polynomial time algorithm
which on input pk and x ∈ Dpk computes fpk(x).
Easy to sample domain X samples elements in the domains of the
permutations, we write x ← X (pk), where x is uniformly random
in Dpk.
Hard to invert For (pk, sk) ← G(k), x ← X (pk), and for any PPT
algorithm A the probability that A(pk, fpk(x)) = x is negligible in
k.
But easy with trapdoor There is a polynomial time algorithm which
on input pk, sk, fpk(x) computes x, for all (pk, sk) ∈ G(k) and x ∈
Dpk.
Let A be any algorithm, and consider the following game, which
we will call the trapdoor game. The game is between A and the tuple
(K, F,G,X ). The algorithm A can ask for a number of public key gen-
erations and element generations, and the goal of A is to invert a per-
mutation, for which it does not know the trapdoor information, on an
element it did not generate itself.
Key Generation On a key generation request, A is given pk for a uni-
formly random key (pk, sk)← G(k, rG) (here rG denotes the random
bits used by G).
Give Up on pk On a give up request on pk, where pk was generated in
a key generation request, A is given rG.
Element Generation for pk On an element generation request for pk,
A receives a uniformly random element y = fpk(x), where x was
generated as x← X (pk, rX ).
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Give Up on y On a give up request on y, where y was generated in an
element generation request, A is given rX .
Wining If A manage to return an element x such that y = fpk(x), where
pk is a key from a key generation request on which A has not given
up and where y is from an element generation request on which A
has not given up, then A wins the game.
It is straightforward to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The tuple (K, F,G,X ) is a collection of trapdoor permutations
iff for all PPT algorithms A, the probability that A wins over (K, F,G,X )
in the trapdoor permutation game is negligible.
3 Non-Committing Encryption
3.1 The General Framework
We will cast the non-committing encryption problem in the framework
for universally composable asynchronous multiparty computation from
[Can01]. In this framework the security of a protocol is defined in three
steps.
First the real-life execution of the protocol is defined. Here the pro-
tocol π is modeled by n interactive Turing machines (ITMs) P1, . . . , Pn
called the parties of the protocols. Also present in the execution is an
adversary A and an environment Z modeling the environment in which
A is attacking the protocol. The environment gives inputs to honest par-
ties, receives outputs from honest parties, and can communication with
A at arbitrary points in the execution. Both A and Z are PPT ITMs.
Second an ideal process is defined. In the ideal process an ideal func-
tionality F is present to which all the parties have a secure communi-
cation channel. The ideal functionality is an ITM defining the desired
input-output behavior of the protocol. Also present is an ideal adversary
S, the environment Z, and n so-called dummy parties P̃1, . . . , P̃n — all
PPT ITMs. The only job of the dummy parties is to take inputs from
the environment and send them to the ideal functionality and take mes-
sages from the ideal functionality and output them to the environment.
This basically makes the ideal process a trivially secure protocol with the
same input-output behavior as the ideal functionality.
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The security of the protocol is then defined by requiring that the pro-
tocol emulates the ideal process. We say that the protocol securely realizes
the ideal functionality.
The framework also defines the hybrid models, where the execution
proceeds as in the real-life execution, but where the parties in addi-
tion have access to an ideal functionality. An important property of the
framework is that an ideal functionality in a hybrid model can securely
be replaced by a sub-protocol securely realizing that ideal functionality.
Below we add a few more details. For a more elaborate treatment of
the general framework, see [Can01].
The framework as we will be using it models asynchronous authen-
ticated communication over point-to-point channels, erasure free com-
putation, and an active adaptive adversary. In the real-life execution
all parties are assumed to share an open point-to-point channel. In the
ideal process all parties are assumed to have a secure channel to the ideal
functionality. These assumptions are modeled by the way the execution
proceeds.
The environment Z is the driver of the execution. It can either pro-
vide a honest party, Pi or P̃i, with an input or send a message to the
adversary. If a party is given an input, that party is then activated.
The party can then, in the real-life execution, send a message to another
party or give an output to the environment. In the ideal process an
activated party just copies its input to the ideal functionality and the
ideal functionality is then activated, sending messages to the parties and
the adversary according to it program. After the party and/or the ideal
functionality stops, the environment is activated again.
If the adversary, A or S, is activated it can do several things. It can
corrupt a honest party, send a message on behalf of a corrupt party, de-
liver any message send from one party to another, or communicate with
the environment. On corrupting a party the adversary sees the entire
communication history of that party including the random bits used in
the execution. After the corruption the adversary sends and receives
messages on behalf of the corrupted party. The adversary controls the
scheduling of the message delivery. In the real-life execution the adver-
saryA can see the contents of all message and may decide which messages
should be delivered and when — it can however not change messages or
add messages to a channel. In the ideal process the adversary S cannot
see the contents of the messages as the channels are assumed to be se-
cure. It can only see that a message has been send and can then decide
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when the message should be delivered, if ever.
If the adversary delivers a message to some party, then this party
is activated and the environment resumes control when the party stops.
At the beginning of the protocol all parties, the adversary, and the en-
vironment is given as input the security parameter k and random bits.
Furthermore the environment is given an auxiliary input z. At some point
the environment stops activating parties and outputs some bit. This bit
is taken to be the output of the execution. We use REALπ,A,Z(k, z)
to denote the random variable describing the real-life execution and use
IDEALF ,S,Z(k, z) to denote the random variable describing the ideal pro-
cess.
We are now ready to state the definition of securely realizing an ideal
functionality. For this purpose let REALπ,A,Z denote the distribution
ensemble {REALπ,A,Z(k, z)}k∈N ,z∈{0,1}∗ and let IDEALF ,S,Z denote the
distribution ensemble {IDEALF ,S,Z(k, z)}k∈N ,z∈{0,1}∗ . We recall the def-
inition of computationally indistinguishable distribution ensembles over
{0, 1}.
Definition 2 (indistinquishable ensembles) We say distribution en-
sembles X = {X(k, z)}k∈N ,z∈{0,1}∗ and Y = {Y (k, z)}k∈N ,z∈{0,1}∗ over
{0, 1} are indistinguishable (written X c≈ Y ) if for any c ∈ N there ex-
ists k0 ∈ N such that |Pr[X(k, z) = 1] − Pr[Y (k, z) = 1]| < k−c for all
k > k0 and all z.
Definition 3 ([Can01]) We say that π securely realizes F if for all real-
life adversaries A there exists an ideal-process adversary S such that for
all environments Z we have that IDEALF ,S,Z c≈ REALπ,A,Z .
3.2 The Random Oracle Model
The random oracle model is the real-life model extended with an ideal
functionality H , called the random oracle, parameterized with two do-
mains X and Y . On input x ∈ X from any party (including the ad-
versary) the random oracle outputs a uniformly random element y ∈ Y
independent of all other evaluations (except that if queried on the same
x twice the same value y will be returned), to the calling party and the
adversary.
In our protocol we will take X = {0, 1}∗ and Y = {0, 1}k.
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3.3 The Non-Committing Encryption Functionality
The non-committing-encryption (NCE) functionality is simply the oracle,
which on input (send, mid, j, m) from P̃i delivers (receive, mid, i, m) to
P̃j and delivers (receive, mid, i, |m|) to A, where |m| denotes the bit-
length of m.
4 The Protocol
On initialization of the protocol each party Pi generates (pki, ski)← G(k)
and sends pki to all other parties. After the key distribution phase the
protocol proceeds as follows.
Send On input (send, mid, j, m) party Pi will generate a uniformly ran-
dom element x← X (pkj), compute (mid, fpkj(x), H(mid‖i‖j‖x)⊕
m), and send this value to Pj .
1
Receive If Pj receives a message (mid, y, R) from Pi, where y ∈ Dpkj ,2
then Pj computes x = f
−1
skj
(y) and m = R ⊕ H(mid‖i‖j‖x) and
outputs (receive, mid, i, m).
Theorem 1 The above protocol securely realizes the NCE functionality
in the random oracle model.
Proof: Let A be any PPT adversary. We construct an ideal process
adversary S, which running in the ideal process will simulate an execution
of the real-life protocol to A and let A do the communication with Z to
convince Z that it is viewing a real-life execution.
Since the protocol runs in the random oracle model, S will also have
to simulate a random oracle H . It simply does this by defining H(h) to
be some uniformly random value r ∈ {0, 1}k, when H(h) is needed. The
definition of H is stored in a dictionary.
1We use ‖ to denote some injective and easily parsable encoding {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗.
2We require from the collection of trapdoor permutations, that one can check
y ∈ Dpkj given just the public key. Intuitively this is needed for security because a
corrupt party Pi might use a honest Pj to determine whether y ∈ Dpkj by observing
Pj ’s behavior on the message (mid, y, R) — remember that by the security preserving
composition property, security in the framework of [Can01] implies that the protocol
is secure in any context, in particular contexts where it can be observed whether
Pj accepts the message or not. Therefore the information whether y ∈ Dpkj or not
should already be available to Pj when sending the message.
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The simulator S will simulate the key-distribution phase by generat-
ing random keys as in the protocol. In fact, to make the proof of security
easier we will assume that S, besides running in the ideal process, par-
ticipates in a trapdoor game. The public keys for the parties will then be
obtained from the trapdoor game using n key generation requests. The
trapdoors will therefore not be known to S.
To be able to simulate without the trapdoors we represent H in a
particular way using two dictionaries raw and img. At the beginning of
the simulation both dictionaries are empty, and H is undefined on all
values.
We record a new definition H(h) := r as follows.
• If h can be parsed as mid‖i‖j‖x, where i and j are indices of parties
and x ∈ Dpkj ,3 then the entry (mid‖i‖j‖y, r), where y = fpkj(x), is
added to img.
• If h cannot be parsed as described above, then (h, r) is added to
raw.
We say that H(h) is defined and H(h) = r iff h = mid‖i‖j‖x and
(mid‖i‖j‖fpkj(x), r) ∈ img or h cannot be parsed as specified above and
(h, r) ∈ raw.
Because fpkj is a permutation, this representation is consistent —
H(h) = r will only become defined if explicitly recorded.
Equally important, this representation allows to define and evaluate
H on h = mid‖i‖j‖x given just (mid, i, j, y), where y = fpkj(x). To look
up H on mid‖i‖j‖x, simply look up mid‖i‖j‖y in img, and to define H
on mid‖i‖j‖x, simply add an entry with key mid‖i‖j‖y to img. We call
these manipulations oblivious.
The simulation proceeds as follows.
Random Oracle Evaluation If A asks for an evaluation of the ran-
dom oracle on some string h, then if H(h) is defined, return H(h),
otherwise generate uniformly random r ∈ {0, 1}k, set H(h) := r,
and return r.
Send On input (send, mid, j, |m|) from the NCE functionality we know
that P̃i has input (send, mid, j, m) for some m ∈ {0, 1}|m| to the
NCE functionality, which has then send (receive, mid, i, m) to P̃j.
3This is the point in the proof, where we use that x ∈ Dpkj can be checked given
just the public key.
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• If P̃j is corrupt, then S will deliver the message to P̃j to learn
m and will then simulate by following the protocol using m as
the message.
• If P̃j is honest, then S simulates the protocol to A by sending
the message (mid, y, R), where y is obtained as a uniformly
random element in the image of fpkj from the trapdoor game
and R ∈ {0, 1}k is chosen uniformly at random.
If at a later point Pi or Pj is corrupted then:
– If Pi was corrupted, then S corrupts P̃i in the ideal process
and learns m.
The simulator then gives up on y and learns x, r such that
y = fpkj(x) and x = X (pk, r). The simulator then gives
up on pki and learns ski, r such that (pki, ski) = G(k, r).
Then the simulator gives this internal view of Pi to A and
defines H(mid‖i‖j‖x) := R⊕m.
– If Pj was corrupted, then S corrupts P̃j in the ideal pro-
cess and learns m.
The simulator then gives up on pkj and learns skj , r such
that (pkj, skj) = G(k, r). Then the simulator gives this
internal view of Pj to A and defines H(mid‖i‖j‖x) :=
R⊕m.
If H(mid‖i‖j‖x) was already defined (to a value different from
R⊕m), then the simulator gives up the simulation.
Receive On the message (mid, y, R) from Pi to Pj the simulator S needs
to make the ideal functionality output (receive, mid, i, m) to P̃j,
where m = R⊕H(mid‖i‖j‖f−1skj(y)).
• If Pi is honest, then (mid, y, R) was send by S itself and in
that case the message (receive, mid, i, m) has already been
send to P̃j in the ideal process. The simulator then simply
delivers this message to P̃j .
• If Pi is corrupt, then decrypt as follows. If H is not defined
on mid‖i‖j‖f−1skj(y), then obliviously define it to a uniformly
random value. Then obliviously look up H(mid‖i‖j‖f−1skj(y))
and let m = R ⊕H(mid‖i‖j‖f−1skj(y)).
Then input (send, mid, j, m) to P̃i in the ideal process and
deliver the message (receive, mid, i, m) to P̃j.
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It is easy to see that if the simulation is not given up, then it is
distributed exactly as a real-life execution. So, if S does not give up the
simulation, then the final output of Z will be identically distributed in
the real-life execution with adversary A and in the ideal process with
adversary S.
It is therefore enough to prove that the probability that the simulation
is given up is negligible. Assume for the sake of contradiction that the
simulation is given up with significant4 probability. This means that with
significant probability
1. The simulator obtained y = fpkj(x) from the trapdoor game and
send (mid, y, R) from honest Pi to honest Pj.
2. The dictionary was defined on the value mid‖i‖j‖x before S needed
to define it on that value.
Since Pi is guaranteed to be honest up to the point in the simulation
where S needs to define the dictionary on the value mid‖i‖j‖x, we can
exclude the probability that the simulator has defined H on mid‖i‖j‖x
twice, as it would involve choosing the same value y in the image of
fpkj twice under the uniform distribution, which happens with negligible
probability. Therefore the other definition of H on mid‖i‖j‖x was made
by the adversary in a Random Oracle Evaluation. The first definition
of H on mid‖i‖j‖x was therefore not oblivious, and thus x = f−1skj(y) is
known. Since both Pi and Pj are honest up to the point where the simula-
tion is given up, the simulator has not given up on y or pkj. This allows
the simulator to win the trapdoor game with significant probability, a
contradiction to Lemma 1.
5 Instantiating the Random Oracle
We have proven our construction secure in the random oracle model.
The pending question is then whether we can construct a proper func-
tion family H , such that using a random function from H instead of
a random oracle is secure — still yields a non-committing encryption
scheme. Unfortunately we cannot. We can even prove that this is not
due to our inability to construct a proper family H or our inability to
prove that it works for a proper family H .
4We call a quantity significant if it is not negligible.
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Put shortly, the reason is that the value
(f(x), H(mid‖i‖j‖x)⊕m)
determines m uniquely for anyone who sees the value and knows H , as f
is a permutation. For this particular instantiation, there might be other
more basic reasons though for the scheme to be insecure — the scheme is
not even guaranteed to semantically secure. We can remedy this by using
a perfect one-way probabilistic hash function[Can97, CMR98]. This is a
function H , where x is ’hashed’ as y = H(x, r), where r is a uniformly
random string. A security notion for these hash functions guarantees that
H(x, r) looks uniformly random even if r is known and partial knowledge
of x is known (which might be the case if e.g. f(x) is known.) Exam-
ples of perfect one-way probabilistic hash functions are constructed in
[Can97, CMR98], and a result from [Can97] allow us to conclude that if
we encrypt as
(f(x), r, H(mid‖i‖j‖x, r)⊕m) ,
for a particular type of perfect one-way probabilistic hash function, then
the scheme is semantically secure.
Since, as detailed above, it might potentially by stronger to use prob-
abilistic function families, we will do so. Still however, m is uniquely de-
termined by (f(x), r, H(mid‖i‖j‖x, r)⊕m) and there is not much hope
that the scheme should be non-committing.
One attempt to try to escape this is to use n(n − 1) functions Hi,j
instead, where Hi,j is only known to Pi and Pj . These functions are
then drawn from a probabilistic function family at the beginning of the
protocol and distributed by a trusted party. However:
Theorem 2 Let H be any probabilistic function family. Then the ran-
dom oracle non-committing encryption scheme, using a secret random
function from H for each pair of parties in place of the oracle, is not a
non-committing encryption scheme.
Proof: Assume for simplicity that for a fixed value of the security pa-
rameter, the description of functions from H all have some fixed length
l (polynomial in k). The analysis generalizes to the case where one con-
siders instead the expected length of a random function from H .
Consider the protocol with two parties P1 and P2 and consider the
environment Z, which activates P1 on a uniformly random message m ∈
{0, 1}l+1. Consider the adversary A, which first delivers all messages of
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the protocol such that P2 will output m. During this the adversary sees
a message (y, r, R). The adversary will output (y, r, R) along with pk2
to the environment. Then the adversary corrupts P1 and P2 and sends
the internal view of P1 and P2 to the environment. This view includes x
such that y = fpk2(x), H1,2 such that m = H1,2(x, r)⊕ R,5 rG such that
(pk2, sk2)← G(k, rG), and rX such that x← X (k, rX ). The environment
outputs a bit e, where e = 1 iff it sees these values.
Note that
Pr[REALA,Z(k, z) = 1] = 1 .
It is therefore (by far) enough to prove that for all6 ideal process adver-
saries S,
Pr[IDEALS,Z(k, z) = 1] ≤ 1
2
.
For this purpose, let S be any ideal process adversary. Let E denote
the event that in the ideal process IDEALS,Z(k, z), the ideal process
adversary S returns to Z values (y, r, R, pk2, sk2, rG, x, rX , H1,2) such that
these values are on the expected syntactic form and (pk2, sk2) = G(k, rG),
x = X (k, rX ), and y = fpk2(x). By definition of Z it is enough to prove
that
Pr[IDEALS,Z(k, z) = 1|E] ≤ 1
2
.
To prove this consider the ideal process IDEALS,Z(k, z) conditioned
on the event E. At some point in the simulation S will send a value
(y, r, R, pk2) to Z. Then P1 and P2 are corrupted. This means that S
is given m and delivers values sk2, rG, x, rXH1,2 to Z, where (pk2, sk2) =
G(k, rG), x = X (k, rX ), and y = fpk2(x). In particular this means that
fpk2 is guaranteed to be a permutation (with inverse f
−1
sk2
) and that y is
in its image. This implies that the value of x became uniquely defined
when S handed (y, r, R, pk2) to Z. Since (y, r, R, pk2) was handed to Z
before the parties were corrupted, the value is independent of m. Since
the possible values of m is at least twice the possible values of H , this
means that with probability at least 1
2
the value of m is such that there
exists no H for which m = H(x, r)⊕R. This proves the theorem.
Put shortly, the entropy of Hi,j should be larger than the entropy
of the communication between P1 and P2. In that case it would how-
ever be more efficient for the parties to just use Vernam’s one-time pad
encryption with the description of Hi,j as the pad.
5For brevity we drop mid, i, and j as input to H1,2.
6Though irrelevant, the result even holds for computationally unbounded ideal
adversaries.
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Note, that if such a protocol should be able to handle an unbounded
number of bits of communication, then the pad should be generated
during the evaluation using an adaptively secure coin-flip protocol. This
is exactly the form of the non-committing encryption protocols in [Bea91,
DN00], where a bit is communicated from Pi to Pj by Pi and Pj first
generating a shared secret random bit R and Pi then sending R ⊕m to
Pj. This therefore yields no new view on the non-committing encryption
problem.
6 A Short Discussion of the Random Ora-
cle Model
6.1 Comparison to Previous Negative Results
Our result is primarily a negative one. We show that there exists pro-
tocols which are secure in the random oracle model and are not secure
in the standard model, no matter how the random oracle is instantiated.
Other examples of primitives secure in the random oracle model and not
in the standard model were known prior to our work.
First of all, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic[FS86] for transferring tree-move
public-coin zero-knowledge proofs into non-interactive ones is provably
secure in the random oracle model, but by the result in [GK90] these
protocols cannot be zero-knowledge in the standard model unless NP is
in BPP.
Yet another negative result is that of [CGH98]. In [CGH98] an en-
cryption scheme and a signature scheme are constructed, which are secure
in the random oracle model, but is not secure in the standard model no
matter the instantiation. Their schemes are however highly unnatural.
They are constructed as to try to “detect” whether they are in the ran-
dom oracle model or not, and then behave insecurely if they are in the
random oracle model.
One strength of the result from [CGH98] over ours is that in [CGH98]
it is the semantic security and the security against forgery of the encryp-
tion scheme respectively the signature scheme that are violated in the
standard model, whereas it in our example it is the less standard non-
committing property that is violated. Their result thus establishes that
even standard security properties does not carry over from the random
oracle model to the standard model.
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Another strength of the result from [CGH98] is that it uses the ran-
dom oracle in an essentially weaker way than it is used in [FS86] and
in our proof. Specifically, in [FS86] and in our simulator, it is used es-
sentially that one can control the random oracle, by defining the value
of H(h) to be some value appropriately chosen by the simulator. E.g.
we set it to R ⊕m to be consistent with some plaintext learned by the
simulator after H “should” have been defined.
Since, the property that the random oracle can be lazily defined by
the simulator is a property that a fixed function is guaranteed not to
have, one could therefore get the impression that the negative results are
due to this very strong use of the control over the oracle in the proof.
Indeed the proof in [CGH98] also exploits this control over random
oracle, but only indirectly through the use of the CS-proofs of [Mic00]
for the random oracle model. It is however easy to see that the result
from [CGH98] still stands if these “non-interactive” proofs for the ran-
dom oracle model are replaced by interactive CS-proofs (which can be
constructed in the standard model under the assumption that collision
resistant hash functions exits[Mic00]).
After this modification, the proof in [CGH98] does not exploit the
control over the oracle. Indeed the oracle could as well be an oracle
external to the simulator/proof, i.e. a uniformly random function to
which also the simulator/proof only has oracle access.
True, the use of interactive CS-proofs makes the schemes in [CGH98]
even more unnatural (now sending a ciphertext/signature to the de-
crypter/verifier involves a four-move protocol.) However, their result
shows that even if the simulator/proof also uses the oracle in a black-
box manner natural security properties still does not carry over to the
standard model.
6.2 Conclusion
It seems that the thesis of [BR93], even though not phrased like that, is
that standard security properties of natural (encryption and signature)
schemes carry over from the random oracle model to the standard model
by a careful instantiation of the random oracle, at least for all practical
reasons — i.e. even though the schemes may not facilitate a formal proof
of security, they are “secure” to use in practice. Indeed this thesis is
what e.g. allows us to conjecture the semantic security-in-practice of the
OAEP-RSA scheme[BR95].
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We do not think that any of the negative results above contradict this
thesis, either the schemes are highly unnatural or the properties lost in
the instantiation are properties not initially intended to be considered in
the framework.
An interesting open question is therefore whether we can identify
“standard security properties” of some subset of “natural schemes” (all
this maybe being defined by a restriction on how the oracle is used in
the scheme and/or in the simulator,) which carry over to the standard
model by a “careful instantiation”.
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[CCD88] David Chaum, Claude Crépeau, and Ivan Damg̊ard. Multi-
party unconditionally secure protocols (extended abstract).
In ACM [ACM88], pages 11–19.
[CFGN96] Ran Canetti, Uri Feige, Oded Goldreich, and Moni Naor.
Adaptively secure multi-party computation. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM Symposium on the The-
ory of Computing, pages 639–648, Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia, 22–24 May 1996.
[CGH98] Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, and Shai Halevi. The random
oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version). In ACM
[ACM98], pages 209–218.
[CKS00] Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, and Victor Shoup. Ran-
dom oracles in constantinople: Practical asynchronous byzan-
tine agreement using cryptography. In Proceedings of the
19th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Comput-
ing (PODC 2000), pages 123–132. ACM, July 2000.
[CMR98] Ran Canetti, Daniele Micciancio, and Omer Reingold. Per-
fectly one-way probabilistic hash functions (preliminary ver-
sion). In ACM [ACM98], pages 131–140.
[DN00] Ivan Damg̊ard and Jesper B. Nielsen. Improved non-
committing encryption schemes based on a general complex-
ity assumption. In Mihir Bellare, editor, Advances in Cryp-
tology - Crypto 2000, pages 432–450, Berlin, 2000. Springer-
Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 1880.
19
[FS86] A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: practical so-
lutions to identification and signature problems. In A. M.
Odlyzko, editor, Advances in Cryptology - Crypto ’86, pages
186–194, Berlin, 1986. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science Volume 263.
[GK90] O. Goldreich and H. Krawczyk. On the composition of zero
knowledge proof systems. In Proceedings of ICALP 90, Berlin,
1990. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume 443.
[Mic00] Silvio Micali. Computationally sound proofs. SIAM Journal
on Computing, 30(4):1253–1298, 2000.
20
Recent BRICS Report Series Publications
RS-01-47 Jesper Buus Nielsen.Non-Committing Encryption is Too Easy
in the Random Oracle Model. December 2001. 20 pp.
RS-01-46 Lars Kristiansen. The Implicit Computational Complexity of
Imperative Programming Languages. November 2001. 46 pp.
RS-01-45 Ivan B. Damg̊ard and Gudmund Skovbjerg Frandsen. An Ex-
tended Quadratic Frobenius Primality Test with Average Case
Error Estimates. November 2001. 43 pp.
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